Security and Privacy for NextG Networks

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
NextG Networks: Extreme Conditions

- Privacy risks (e.g., user location)
- Low-end hosts (Internet of Insecure Things)
- Tremendous scale (# devices, churn)
- Tight latency and reliability requirements
- Complex protocols, software, equipment
- Variable wireless network properties
- Variable CPU/storage (host, edge, cloud)




End-Host Session Protocols

- Internet protocols were not designed for
 - Mobility: changing of network attachments
 - Multihoming: using multiple interfaces
 - Middleboxes: steering traffic through functions
- Where should we solve these problems?
 - Network: routing
 - End-host: session protocols
- Session protocols are more flexible and scalable
 - E.g., multipath TCP, connection migration in QUIC, etc.



Session Protocols to Protect User Privacy

- Protecting privacy
 - IP addresses reveal user identity (and location)
 - Size of data transfers can reveal the content (e.g., fingerprinting)
- Change IP addresses within a data transfer




Programmable Network Defenses

- NextG networks are attractive targets
 - Cyber-physical systems affecting the Real World
 - Even short service disruptions are a problem
 - End hosts are insecure and have limited resources
- Deep network programmability
 - Customize to handle ever-evolving attacks
 - React quickly, directly in the data plane










Programmable Network Defense

- Higher-level query languages
 - E.g., destination receiving traffic from many sources
 - E.g., flow responsible for a large fraction of backlog in queue



- Closed-loop control of the network
 - Integrate measurement, analysis, and control
 - E.g., probabilistically drop packets responsible for queue backlog
 - (Verified) compiler synthesizing the control and data plane code

Rethinking the Division of Labor: From Top-to-Bottom and End-to-End







Session protocols

Radio access network

Programmable defenses