



# NSF NextG Security Workshop

---

## The “Physical” Layer



Lee Swindlehurst  
*University of California Irvine*

# NSF NextG Security Workshop

---

- **Physical Layer Security**

- Ugly step-child of the security world
- But has a compelling story:
  - not subject to computational advances
  - natural shared randomness in wireless channel
  - perfect secrecy is theoretically possible

- **Many advances of this decade have found their way to practice**

- Massive MIMO
- NOMA
- Hybrid beamforming
- Cell-free or distributed MIMO, etc.

- **Why not PLS?**

- CSI often assumed for adversary (req'd for secrecy metrics)
- Strong assumptions about adversary => insistence on perfect secrecy
- Design for worst case, conservative solutions
- Emphasis on secrecy performance, not on desired link reliability
- Artificial noise/jamming not appropriate in interference-limited scenarios
- capability of PHY-generated keys is often limited
- cryptographic methods aren't chopped liver after all ....

# Some Reasons for Optimism

---

## • 5G and IoT


- may require lightweight security, room for PLS
- emphasis on reliability, delay, massive connectivity
  - guaranteed low-rates, fixed constellations => finite alphabet metrics
  - PLS is a plus for latency
  - connectivity => exploit multi-user interference to hide sensitive data
  - constructive interference, symbol-level precoding

## • Vehicular Networks

- We know where the adversaries are
- .... and we communicate with them!
- A role for AN/jamming here, but must consider radar performance

## • Distributed MIMO & mmWave

- CSI reveals location information
- Wide aperture creates secure microcells
- Also possible with UAVs



# Some Reasons for Optimism

---

- **Heuristic approaches**

- fountain codes, exploits asymmetric decoding success
- combine RF and biometric fingerprinting for authentication, key generation
- AI/ML as a tool to extract common information for PHY keys
- non-linear precoding