



# **Institute for the Wireless Internet of Things**

at Northeastern University



## **Securing the Open RAN**

### **NSF Workshop on Next-G Security**

Tommaso Melodia


# Vertical Disaggregation

---


## Traditional approach




## Virtualized RAN




# Horizontal Disaggregation



# O-RAN – “Horizontal Disaggregation” and Abstraction



# End-to-End Programmable, Virtualized



# Implications of Open RAN and Virtualization

---

1. End-to-end Virtualization, Open RAN, and service-based architecture result in new security challenges
2. Softwarization and Open RAN open exciting opportunities for security research
3. Virtualization enables opportunities to test at scale


# NSF Workshop on Next-G Security

---

## New security challenges

# Expanded Threat Surface

Intelligence



Interfaces

Functional split

te for the Wireless  
at of Things



# Example: O-RAN Lower Layer Split (LLS) 7-2x

---

- O-RU can access O-DU through Open Fronthaul Interface
  - Manipulate parameters
  - Reconfigure the node
  - Management traffic to Northbound Interface – Man in the middle attack





Figure 4: O-RAN Open Fronthaul

# Intelligence In the Open RAN

## 4. AI in the core: orchestration, slicing




3. AI at the edge: RAN optimization, caching, edge services



2. AI in the RAN: scheduling, mobility, access

1. AI on mobile devices: real-time, waveform-based adaptation

# New Control Loops that need to be “secured”



# New Tenants in the Network – the xApp developer



# Implications of RIC and Intelligence

---

- **New threats**
  - Third-party Near-RT RIC apps: potential carrier for attacks
  - Near-RT RIC signaling conflicts with gNodeB control plane
  - Multiple RIC xApps: conflicting signals, inconsistent/incorrect behavior
  - Denial of Service Attacks through xApps
  - Privacy Concerns: UE identification in the RIC
  - xApps can be configured through A1 interface to track users
  - Adversaries can inject data to get xApps to learn incorrect behaviors
- **Research Opportunitites**
  - Forecasting threats
  - Closed-loop detection and mitigation of cross-layer attacks
  - Software-defined Reconfiguration
  - Joint optimization of RAN resources and of VNF to counter attacks
  - Adversarial Learning

# Artificial Intelligence in Wireless

---

## Testing at Scale

# PAWR PLATFORMS WERE CHOSEN TO BE GEOGRAPHICALLY DIVERSE AND RESEARCH FOCUS INDEPENDENT



## **POWDER**

Salt Lake City, UT

Software defined networks and massive MIMO



## **COSMOS**

West Harlem, NY


Millimeter wave and backhaul research



## **AERPAW**

Raleigh, NC

Unmanned aerial vehicles and mobility



## **Rural Broadband Platform**

TBD

*Coming late 2020*

---

**Colosseum** – *World's largest RF emulator, located at Northeastern University in Boston*

# ***COLOSSEUM: The World's Largest Network Emulator***

---



- 256 USRP X310s → 128 as user devices, 128 as part of Colosseum Massive Channel Emulator (MCHEM)
- 65,536 100 MHz emulated RF channels
- 21 racks of radios, 171 high-performance servers w/ CPUs / GPUs
- Full-mesh networking capability
- Massive Computing and support resources: (CPU, GPU, FPGA)
  - 900 TB of Network Attached Storage (NAS)
  - 320 FPGAs
  - 18 10G switches
  - 25 clock distribution systems
  - 52 TB/s of digital RF data